Hastings Law Journal
Volume 62 | Issue 3

Article 6

2-2011

Note – Don’t Steal My Sunshine: Deconstructing
the Flawed Presumption of Privacy for Unfiled
Documents Exchanged During Discovery
Mary Elizabeth Keaney

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mary Elizabeth Keaney, Note – Don’t Steal My Sunshine: Deconstructing the Flawed Presumption of Privacy for Unfiled Documents
Exchanged During Discovery, 62 Hastings L.J. 795 (2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol62/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Keaney_62-HLJ-795 (Do Not Delete)

3/4/2011 12:26 PM

Don’t Steal My Sunshine: Deconstructing the
Flawed Presumption of Privacy for Unfiled
Documents Exchanged During Discovery
Mary Elizabeth Keaney*
Courts encourage settlement as a way to resolve disputes efficiently and clear congested
dockets, but settlement agreements can have a sinister effect too. It is becoming
common in modern litigation to draft settlement agreements that require the return of
discovery materials and the sealing of court documents from public view. Legitimate
privacy concerns warrant sealing pretrial discovery and other court documents.
However, the practice of keeping information vital to the public health and safety
sealed for a price is illegitimate, and should be prohibited.
Legislative efforts are being made to monitor the impact that secret settlement
agreements have on public health and safety and to make the litigation process more
transparent, but opponents have succeeded in blocking such legislation thus far. The
primary objection raised by opponents to the Sunshine in Litigation Act and similar
legislation is that there is a presumption of privacy for materials exchanged during
pretrial discovery that is not filed with the court. Opponents rely upon a distinction
between filed and unfiled discovery to support this presumption of privacy.
This Note demonstrates that such a presumption has no place in the debate over this
legislation, and relies on a close examination of the history of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) for filing and discovery to unwrap the mistaken presumption
advanced by the Judicial Conference and other opponents to the legislation. From the
inception of the FRCP, there has been a public right of access to discovery materials,
whether filed with the court or not. The advent of technology has resulted in
voluminous document exchange in pretrial discovery. Any changes to the filing
requirements were aimed at relieving the burden and expense associated with storing
discovery information, and not intended to create a presumption of privacy for
documents not filed with the courts.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. Many thanks to
my faculty advisor, Richard Zitrin, for sharing his expertise on this subject and his guidance in drafting
this Note.
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Introduction
Many are familiar with the flurry of accidents resulting from
separating tire treads on Bridgestone/Firestone tires in the 1990s.
Accidents around the country resulted in serious injuries and fatalities to
unsuspecting drivers, and ultimately, the company recalled over three
1
million tires. What most do not know is that Bridgestone/Firestone
settled hundreds of cases involving the dangerous tires, many with secret
settlement agreements, well before the public learned of the danger the
2
tires posed. If the court records from those settlement agreements had
been available to the public, many lives might have been saved.
The legislature can safeguard the public from experiencing a similar
3
tragedy in the future by enacting the Sunshine in Litigation Act. The Act
was prompted by stories like the Bridgestone/Firestone recall, and
dozens of other cases involving hazards and threats to public health
4
where court documents were sealed from the public. There are
numerous cases where the practice of agreeing to seal settlement
documents that would otherwise be available to the public may result in
additional fatalities, serious injuries, and illnesses. Aimed at eliminating
this public danger, the Act asks judges to consider public health and
safety before granting a protective order or sealing court records and
5
settlement agreements. Judges are given the discretion to grant or deny
secrecy based on a balancing test that weighs the public’s interest in a
potential public health and safety hazard against the parties’ legitimate
6
interests in secrecy.
I. The Judicial Conference’s Reports
It might seem unlikely that legislation aimed at protecting the public
in such a profound way would be met with rigorous dissent, but that is

1. Press Release, Bridgestone/Firestone Announces Voluntary Recall of 3.85 Million RADIAL
ATX and RADIAL ATX II Tires, and 2.7 Million Wilderness AT Tires (Aug. 9, 2000),
http://usgovinfo.about.com/blfirestone.htm; Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl Introduces Bill to
Protect Public Safety in Secret Court Settlements (Mar. 5, 2009), http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/
pressrelease.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1464=2347 (reporting that over 250 people died in accidents
related to the defective tires).
2. See Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, supra note 1.
3. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, S. 537, 111th Cong. (2009).
4. See S. Rep. No. 110-439, at 3–8 (2008) (listing numerous examples to show the impact of
secret settlements on public health and safety, including Zomax, Zyprexa, Phenylpropanolamine
(PPA), Bjork-Shiley heart valve, Dalkon Shield, silicone breast implants, Ephedra, ‘‘Park-to-Reverse’’
malfunction, side-saddle gas tanks, Cooper tires, all terrain vehicles, playground equipment, and
portable cribs).
5. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. § 1660 (2009).
6. Id.
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precisely what has occurred. The most recent hurdle to passing the
proposed legislation comes from the Judicial Conference.
The Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009 was introduced to the House
7
of Representatives in March of 2009. The Act presents a proposed
amendment to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) that is intended to “prohibit courts from shielding important
health and safety information from the public as part of legal settlement
8
agreements” and protective orders. Earlier in 2009, the Judicial
Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and its
9
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules were asked to consider the
10
suitability of the Act. The Judicial Conference Committees ultimately
opposed the bill on the grounds that it effectively amends the FRCP
11
without engaging in the rulemaking process. In addition to this
procedure-based objection, the Judicial Conference Committees make
three principal arguments in their opposition: First, the bill is
unnecessary; second, it would impose an intolerable burden on the
federal courts; and third, it would have significant adverse consequences
on civil litigation, such as increasing cost and making it more difficult to
12
protect important privacy interests.

7. H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. (2009). Senator Herbert Kohl originally introduced the bill to the
103rd Congress as “a bill to amend chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, relating to protective
orders, sealing of cases, disclosures of discovery information in civil actions, and for other purposes.”
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1993, S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1993). It has been reintroduced annually since
then, and while this Note was drafted, a revised version was before the House as H.R. 5419, the
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2010. H.R. 5419, 111th Cong. (2010). That bill was sponsored by
Congressman Jerrold Nadler and represented an amended version of the Senate bill sponsored by
Senator Kohl in 2009. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, S. 537, 111th Cong. (2009). The
legislation was reintroduced to the 112th Congress by Congressman Nadler on February 9, 2011 as
H.R. 592, the Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2011. H.R. 592, 112th Cong. (2011).
8. See Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, supra note 1.
9. When discussed together, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules will be called the “Judicial Conference
Committees.” References to the Judicial Conference Committees are in the present context and refer
to the body opposing the Sunshine in Litigation Act. When discussed separately, I use the “Advisory
Committee” to refer to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in place at the time of the revision to
FRCP. The “Advisory Committee” in this context has no view on the Sunshine legislation. See infra
Part IV.
10. When considering the proposed Act, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure worked in tandem with its Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. See Sunshine in
Litigation Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 55 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R.
Kravitz, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Conn.).
11. Id. For an explanation of the rulemaking process, visit The Rulemaking Process, U.S. Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx (last visited
Feb. 2, 2011).
12. Hearing, supra note 10, at 56 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz). The Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure first articulated these objections in a prior
review of the legislation. See id. S. 5419 was amended to address some of the objections. Interview
with Richard Zitrin, Lecturer in Law, Univ. of Cal. Hastings, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 22, 2010).
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The Judicial Conference Committees’ findings are not surprising.
Numerous objections have been raised over the years to similar
legislation. The principal objection espoused at the outset, and still relied
upon today, is that an enhanced judicial responsibility to scrutinize
protective orders and secret settlement agreements would burden an
13
already overworked judiciary. Beyond considerations of judicial
economy, opponents of the legislation also raise concerns about an
undetermined threshold trigger for judicial oversight, a genuine need to
protect trade secrets and other privacy considerations, lack of sufficient
evidence to establish a widespread problem, and the chance that
14
interference with party agreements will deter settlements. While some
of these considerations have merit, others do not. When viewed in light
of the larger principle that the courts have an overarching duty to protect
the public interest, none of these considerations can overcome the need
for implementing an enhanced scheme of judicial review for agreements
15
implicating public health and safety. In fact, no single concern, or any of
them collectively, adequately justifies the position that discovery
materials are presumptively private.
There is a longstanding debate in the legal community about the
scope of this problem and the need to find a solution for it. Proponents
of legislation regulating conditioned settlement agreements believe that
the justice system is meant to protect the public interest as a whole, not
16
just the individual litigants in a particular case. Advocates for more
transparency in the settlement process believe that when genuine threats
to public health and safety are implicated, secret settlement conditions
17
cannot be tolerated, ever. Further, these advocates understand that
while there are legitimate reasons to enter into an agreement that
requires the substantive information learned during discovery to remain
18
confidential, those reasons are not always implicated when the courts
are sanctioning protective orders and sealing court documents.

13. Hearing, supra note 10, at 61; see also Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 23–27 (1983); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 487 (1991). The ABA also opposes
enacting the legislation for similar reasons. See Independence of the Judiciary: Sunshine in Litigation
Act, Am. Bar Ass’n, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/sunshine/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
14. These historical objections will be discussed briefly infra Part III.
15. Some oppose even this basic premise that the court system is in place not only to resolve
individual disputes, but also to serve the public interest at large. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 63 (“The
reality of civil litigation is that it ordinarily serves to resolve private disputes.”).
16. See Richard Zitrin, The Judicial Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public
Interest?, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1565, 1568 (2004); see also Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the
Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 711, 715
(2004); James E. Rooks, Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 859, 875
(2004).
17. Interview with Richard Zitrin, supra note 12.
18. Examples of legitimate reasons include protection of trade secrets and genuine privacy
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This Note will demonstrate that those opposed to transparency in
litigation have relied heavily on a mistaken assumption that is critical to
the viability of their position. The notion that information exchanged
during discovery is presumptively private is not supported by a close
examination of the history and evolution of the rules governing
discovery. If this mistaken assumption is brought to light, this Note may
inspire opponents to Sunshine in Litigation legislation to reconsider their
views. Even if opponents are not entirely persuaded to change camps, an
accurate recount of the state of modern discovery is still relevant to the
debate.

II. Road Map
Part III of this Note will first examine the historical objections to
this kind of legislation and briefly address the arguments for and against
those objections. Part IV will focus on the current and leading opposition
asserted by the Judicial Conference and includes an analysis of the
history of the rules governing the filing of court documents and the
19
applicability of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart as primary support for the
Judicial Conference Committees’ findings. Part V will suggest that this
legislation properly targets the rules governing discovery, in particular,
Rule 26(c) requests for protective orders. Part V also includes an analysis
of the history of the rules governing discovery and the intended scope of
the Act.
A. Does the Public Have a Right to Access Discovery Materials?
A threshold inquiry into this issue revolves around the public’s right
to access information exchanged during pretrial litigation. Litigation
takes place in a public forum. It primarily serves the purpose of resolving
disputes between parties, but also encompasses a higher purpose of
instilling confidence in the role of the judiciary as a protector of the
20
public interest. Accordingly, the use of discovery in the name of
accountability to the public at-large is in line with the scope of the
judiciary’s role to protect the public interest.
Even opponents to transparency in litigation concede that there are
exceptions to a blanket prohibition of public access to unfiled discovery
materials. One commentator contends that “any use of discovery
21
materials except to prepare for trial is inappropriate.” However, the

interests for minors. I will discuss this topic further infra Part III.
19. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
20. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1568.
21. Marcus, supra note 13, at 7. Professor Marcus presents this statement in an article exploring
protective orders and the public’s right to information obtained in discovery. See id. at 5.
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same commentator also concedes that there are notable exceptions to
this principle, including when
(1) the information is needed as evidence in other litigation; (2) the
information formed the basis of a pretrial ruling on the merits and
access is necessary to permit evaluation of that ruling; or (3) in
extremely rare cases, the subject of the litigation is alleged
governmental misconduct, and there is a strong public interest in
22
access.

These exceptions are often implicated in cases where the Sunshine
legislation would prevent the sealing of discovery materials and easily fit
into the underlying policy of protecting the public interest. Beyond the
role of the judiciary as a protector of the public interest, the discussion
that follows makes clear that the drafters of the Rules themselves
contemplated a presumption of transparency in discovery.
B. Privacy Rights in Discovery: The Mistaken Assumption
Opponents to the legislation rely on a “longstanding recognition
that while there is no public right of access to information exchanged
between litigants in discovery, there is a presumptive public right of
23
access to information that is filed in court and used in deciding cases” to
explain the committee’s opposition to the Sunshine legislation.
Opponents rely on this division between filed and unfiled information to
justify the extension of greater privacy rights for information exchanged
24
during litigation that is not filed with the court. This Note will
demonstrate that such an extension is misplaced. Instead, the actual
motivation for restricted discovery filing requirements in the Rules stems
from attempts to curb undue expense in discovery and to address
limitations related to storage capacity. In fact, the filing requirements
have no connection to privacy rights of individual litigants. Privacy
interests are addressed by the discovery rule governing protective
25
orders. Therefore, any presumption of privacy in unfiled discovery is
mistaken and does not represent an explicit policy choice to preserve
privacy at the discovery stage. Rather, it is an unintended consequence of
26
the amendments made to the rules governing filing requirements.

22. Id. at 73.
23. Memorandum on Behalf of the Judicial Conference’s Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure & the Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Civil Procedure, Comments on Additional
Language Proposed for H.R. 1508 (Nov. 2009) (on file with the Author) [hereinafter Comments on
Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508]; see also Hearing, supra note 10, at 59–60 (prepared
statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz) (recognizing a general rule that what is produced in discovery is
not public information).
24. Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) That the Federal Rules Do Not
Declare That Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 331, 354–55 (2006).
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37.
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III. The Historical Debate over the Sunshine in Litigation Act
Before addressing the current iteration of opposition to the
Sunshine in Litigation Act in more detail, it is vital to understand the
historical objections to transparency in pretrial litigation that remain part
of the debate over this legislation.
A. There Is No Widespread Problem Worthy of Judicial Reform
From the outset, opponents to any form of secret settlement or
27
protective order oversight have denied that a problem even exists. They
argue that there is no empirical evidence showing that sealed settlements
or stipulated protective orders are a problem warranting remedy. “[T]he
number of cases that conceivably could contain information that has any
bearing on public health or safety is minuscule compared to the corpus of
28
litigation in this country.” This position was reinforced when the
Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) released reports on protective orders
29
and settlement agreements, in 1996 and 2004 respectively. The Advisory
Committee had called for these studies in response to pending litigation
and concerns over abuses involving protective orders and sealed
30
settlements.
In the 1996 study, the FJC conducted research on protective orders
and found that “there is no evidence that protective orders in fact create
any significant problem in concealing information about public
31
hazards . . . .” The FJC’s 2004 study addressed similar concerns related
to abuses involving sealed settlement agreements filed in federal district
courts and made similar findings. The study focused on how often and
under what circumstances settlement agreements were sealed and found
that secret settlements account for less than one half of one percent of
cases, and that in those cases, generally “the only thing kept secret by the
32
sealing of a settlement agreement is the amount of the settlement.”
Both studies have historically been cited by opponents to this kind of
legislation to support the conclusion that, in light of the relatively small
percentage of cases that implicate conditioned settlement agreements

27. Miller, supra note 13, at 432.
28. Id. at 477.
29. See Robert Timothy Reagan et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Sealed Settlement Agreements in
Federal District Court (2004); Elizabeth C. Wiggins, et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Protective Order
Activity in Three Federal Judicial Districts (1996).
30. Letter from Paul V. Niemeyer, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to Henry
J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 1–2 (Mar. 23, 1998) (on
file with the Hastings Law Journal); see Hearing, supra note 10, at 63–64 (prepared statement of Hon.
Mark R. Kravitz) (1996 report); id. at 66–67 (2004 report).
31. Letter from Paul V. Niemeyer, supra note 30, at 2; see also Wiggins et al., supra note 29, at 3
(finding that protective orders occurred in five-to-ten percent of cases in the districts the FJC
surveyed).
32. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 8.
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and protective orders, there is no need for legislation reforming the
33
current practices.
Further scrutiny of the study itself easily defeats this argument.
Because the settlement agreement study dealt only with filed
agreements, the study overlooked a huge segment of cases relevant to
34
this matter. As most settlement agreements are not filed with the court,
35
any data from this study are incomplete at best.
Further, at least a dozen well-known examples of the true and
dramatic implications of secret settlements on public health and safety
36
can be cited to show there is indeed a problem worthy of examination.
While secret settlements may account for only a small fraction of cases,
and admittedly, citing to a dozen cases does not necessarily justify a
sweeping overhaul of current judicial procedure, these numbers are
deceiving.
The number of lives impacted in those named cases certainly
justifies further exploration of this issue. In his tort reform article, Ross
Cheit notes that at least one of the sealed settlement cases studied by the
37
FJC concerned more than fifty claims and eighty-six victims. This
observation illustrates that the impact of a single case can be widespread
38
despite the misleading implication of the FJC’s statistical analysis.
The FJC also emphasized that in most sealed cases, the complaint is
not sealed, giving the public access to party names and to the general
39
allegations of wrongdoing. Access to the complaint alone is inadequate.
Too often, complaints make only general allegations, and the details of
40
the controversy come out only after some discovery. While the
heightened pleading requirement for federal civil cases may alleviate this
41
problem to a degree, it cannot be relied upon as the sole judicial
33. Hearing, supra note 10, at 67 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz).
34. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 3.
35. Memorandum from the Am. Ass’n for Justice (Mar. 6, 2009) (on file with the Hastings Law
Journal). The memorandum points out other flaws in the reports:
First, when documents and settlements are sealed, often the fact that they were sealed is
also sealed. As the FJC found, in some cases the entire case file, including complaint, was
sealed with no explanation. Second, it was a very limited study that only looked at cases
disposed of in 54 of the 94 judicial districts during a one-year period from 2000 to 2001.
Id.
36. See S. Rep. No. 110-439, at 3–8 (2008).
37. Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public Interest, 13 Roger Williams U.
L. Rev. 232, 243 n.47 (2008) (discussing the sexual abuse scandal that permeated so much of the
Catholic church).
38. Id. at 241–42 (noting that the 2004 FJC study included a sample from just over half of the
federal districts, fifty-two out of ninety-four, thereby weakening the strength of the analysis).
39. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 8.
40. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 586 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
antitrust cases . . . ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators[]’ . . . .” (quoting Hosp.
Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. See id. at 556 (majority opinion) (holding that plaintiffs must include enough facts in their
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mechanism to ensure public access to information relevant to public
health and safety.
B. Even If There Is a Problem, the Proposed Solution Infringes on
Existing Rights
Moving forward under the assumption that the scope of the problem
is broad enough to warrant further consideration, opponents raise other
hurdles to the successful implementation of a solution. One such hurdle
is the notion that corporations have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
42
their business operations and trade secrets. This is often the justification
43
for issuing protective orders in products liability and tort cases —as it
should be when those interests are legitimate. However, those legitimate
interests are not always implicated when protective orders and sealed
settlement agreements are involved.
Interests of public health and safety must trump any privacy interests
44
of litigants, even when trade secrets are involved. “[T]here is no
legitimate need to protect a product or service that hurts people. If it is a
defective product, there is no trade secret to protect—no one is going to
45
copy that design.” Requiring the courts to review protective orders and
to balance the competing interests of the parties with the overall interest
of the public at large is the proper approach in this regard.
C. FRCP 26(c) Already Addresses the Problem
Tangential to the privacy argument is the notion that Rule 26(c)
already adequately addresses this issue. The argument is that “courts
review motions for protective orders carefully and often deny or modify
them to grant only the protection needed, recognizing the importance of
46
public access to court filings.” Therefore, imposing more responsibility
on the courts is unwarranted and cannot be justified in light of the
increased costs, time, and burden. But what about stipulated protective
orders, or when a motion is not carefully reviewed with an eye toward
public health and safety implications? Stipulated orders save time and
promote judicial efficiency. While the judiciary surely does not intend to
complaints to make it plausible, not merely possible or conceivable, that they will be able to discover
facts supporting their claims); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (holding that the
Twombly test applies to all complaints, not only those in antitrust cases).
42. Miller, supra note 13, at 470.
43. See Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1590.
44. Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L.
Rev. 883, 887 (2004).
45. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1590.
46. Sunshine Litigation Bill Unnecessary, The Third Branch (Sept. 1 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/
News/TheThirdBranch/08-09-01/Sunshine_Litigation_Bill_Unnecessary.aspx; see also William A.
Ruskin, When a Little Sunshine May Cause a Burn, Toxic Tort Litig. Blog, (Apr. 22, 2009, 11:03
AM), http://www.toxictortlitigationblog.com/articles/sunshine-in-litigation-act-of/.
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skimp when reviewing party motions, given the sheer volume of papers
that pass through chambers, it is plausible that some party motions will
be granted without first considering the impact on public health and
safety. The Sunshine in Litigation Act addresses these gaps in existing
procedure by putting public health and safety at the forefront when
47
considering requests to seal information, stipulated or otherwise.
D. Considerations of Judicial Economy
Finally, opponents to transparency point to an already
overburdened judiciary and suggest that adding another time-consuming
48
task will only exacerbate the problem. This is a legitimate concern.
Some suggest private alternative dispute resolution as an alternative to
litigation but acknowledge that there are significant adverse
49
consequences to privatizing dispute resolution. Others find that the
judiciary can accommodate this procedural change. Judge Joseph
Anderson Jr., of the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, is a principal actor in the effort to ban secret settlements
50
all together and is not swayed by this proposition. In fact, Judge
Anderson argues that transparency in discovery will foster judicial
economy because parties litigating similar issues will not have to reinvent
51
the wheel every time if they are granted access to discovery materials.
Further, once the legislation has been implemented by the courts,
“workloads [will] return to normal as litigants learn of the futility of
seeking improper protective orders—and the possibility of sanctions for
52
requesting such orders in bad faith.”
Other popular objections include that more cases will be filed due to
copycat litigation, that cases will not settle, or that cases will settle too
quickly. These have all been addressed in other legal scholarship, and I
53
will not reiterate those arguments here. The overarching point is that
despite legitimate concerns about the courts’ capacity to implement the
proposed legislation, such concerns cannot outweigh the courts’ critical
function of protecting the public interest. An increased burden on the
courts cannot quell the need for a solution when there are threats to
public health and safety involved.

47. H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. § 1660 (2009).
48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49. See Cheit, supra note 37, at 281–83.
50. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1582.
51. Anderson, supra note 16, at 743–46.
52. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1591.
53. See generally Rooks, supra note 16, at 863–65 (describing arguments over secrecy in
litigation).
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IV. The Current Debate over the Sunshine in Litigation Act
While some of the arguments discussed above remain active in the
debate over enacting the Sunshine in Litigation Act, an alternative focus
has shifted toward privacy in the pretrial phases of litigation.
A. Privacy Rights in Discovery: The Mistaken Assumption
As mentioned earlier, opponents to the legislation mistakenly rely
on a belief that there is no presumptive right of access to information
that is filed in court to explain the Judicial Conference Committees’
54
opposition to the proposed legislation. Opponents use this misplaced
division between filed and unfiled information to justify the extension of
greater privacy rights to information exchanged during litigation that is
not filed with the court. However, the true motivation for restricted
discovery filing requirements can be found in a careful review of the
revisions and amendments to the FRCP over the past several decades.
1. A Brief History of Rule 5: Serving and Filing of Pleadings and
Other Papers
Rule 5 of the FRCP governs the serving and filing of pleadings and
55
other papers with the court. According to Wright and Miller, as
explained in Federal Practice and Procedure, Rule 5 serves two purposes:
(1) ensuring the exchange of all written communication to all parties in
56
the litigation, and (2) creating an “orderly court record for each case.”
Further, the treatise explains that changes to Rule 5 over the years have
been a “response[] to advances in information technology[,] and . . . have
57
sought to reduce the burdens on counsel and the courts.”
a. Early Amendments
The 1970 amendments to the FRCP in general, and Rule 5 in
particular, are central to this discussion. Before 1970, Rule 5 did not
explicitly include discovery materials in the filing requirements, but
58
instead made reference only to notices and demands. In 1970, the FRCP
were amended to emphasize that the requirement included discovery
59
materials, such as answers or responses pursuant to Rules 33, 34, and 36.
More precisely, Rule 5(a) was amended to include the filing of “every
paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the
54. Comments on Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508, supra note 23; see also Hearing,
supra note 10, at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz) (recognizing a general rule that
what is produced in discovery is not public information); discussion supra note 9.
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.
56. 4B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1141,
at 411 (3d ed. 2002).
57. Id. § 1142, at 412.
58. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1970) advisory committee note; 12A Charles Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure app. c, at 125 (2010 Appendices).
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1970) advisory committee note; 12A Wright et al., supra note 58.
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60

court otherwise orders.” In fact, “Rule 5(d) is not intended to curtail
any third-party access to pretrial discovery documents, but only to
61
alleviate the courts’ ‘serious problems of storage.’” The change was in
keeping with the original intent of the Rule: to ensure full exchange of
information among parties and the court.
Later, due to the changing nature of discovery in the modern era, a
revision to Rule 5 restricted the filing requirement by allowing the lower
courts “to order that discovery materials not be filed unless requested by
62
the court or by the parties.” The Advisory Committee at the time
explained that the “added expense and the large volume of discovery
filings present[ed] serious problems of storage,” prompting the 1980
63
amendment of the Rule.
However, change did not come easily. The first proposed revision, in
1978, ignited controversy about the scope and necessity of this approach
64
to solve problems related to expense and storage. In fact, this revision
would have eliminated the requirement to file discovery materials not
65
used in a proceeding. However, in light of the controversy, a
compromise was reached. Because “such materials are sometimes of
interest to those who may have no access to them except by a
requirement of filing,” the 1980 amendment retained the filing
requirement, while giving local courts discretion to authorize court
66
orders that excuse filing if necessary in their district. The Advisory
Committee explicitly stated that the change was directed at managing the
expense and the associated burden that comes with modern litigation,
67
not at denying public access.
Even with this tempered amendment in place, the 1980 amendment
continued to fuel controversy. There was a great deal of concern with

60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) (1970).
61. 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 462 n.5 (citing In re Consumers Power Co.
Secs. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 50 (E.D. Mich. 1985)). But see United States v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85,
91 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding that documents that play no role in performance of Article III functions,
such as discovery documents passed between parties, are not presumed to be public). In Vazquez, the
court referenced Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), but acknowledged an analogous
contradictory proposition that “there is no presumptive first amendment public right of access.”
Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (citing Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986))
(emphasis added).
62. 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 462. The 1970 revision anticipated the
increased burden on the courts due to voluminous papers and numerous parties, and empowered the
court to “vary the requirement if in a given case [the filing requirement] proves needlessly onerous.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1970) advisory committee note.
63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1980) advisory committee note.
64. Id.
65. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
77 F.R.D. 613, 622 (1978); 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1142, at 417.
66. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1980) advisory committee note (emphasis added).
67. Am. Bar Ass’n, Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse,
92 F.R.D. 137, app. at 156–57 (1980).
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respect to the court’s newfound discretionary power to decide which
68
materials must be filed and which need not. This discretionary role was
in direct conflict with the traditional view that discovery materials were
considered public documents, open to the public once filed with the
69
courts. The prospect that some discovery might not be filed left open
the possibility that information relevant to public health and safety could
be shielded from public scrutiny. Some argued that orders waiving the
filing requirement should be issued only when there was not a strong
public interest involved, and that easing the discovery burden on the
70
parties could not justify a filing waiver in such cases. The debate set off
by the amendment initiated thousands of pages of legal scholarship on
71
the topic and the issue remains unsettled today.
b. Recent Amendments
Further changes to Rule 5 filing requirements did not greatly affect
public access to court documents until the most recent amendment in
72
2000. After the 2000 amendments, Rule 5(d) read:
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party,
together with a certificate of service, must be filed with the court within
a reasonable time after service, but disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) or
(2) and the following discovery requests and responses must not be
filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing:
(i) depositions, (ii) interrogatories, (iii) requests for documents or to
73
permit entry upon land, and (iv) requests for admission.

The amended rule adopted the more restrictive approach previously
74
abandoned in the 1980 amendment. The rule now prohibits the filing of
discovery materials unless it is used in a proceeding, or the court so
orders. This new procedure results in a dramatic upheaval of the

68. 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 462 n.6 (“[A New York Times] article
characterized the change as giving federal judges ‘the power to prevent public access to a huge number
of documents that now belong to the record.’” (quoting Editorial, Paper Justice, N.Y. Times, July 22,
1982, at A18)); see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) (“As a general
proposition, pretrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for
denying the public access to the proceedings.”). Grady acknowledged that there is a split among the
courts on the propriety of modifying protective orders to allow access to a nonparty, but ultimately
allowed the discovery to be shared to avoid the “wastefulness of requiring [duplication of] analyses
and discovery already made.” 594 F.2d at 597.
69. See 8A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2042, at 221 (3d
ed. 2010).
70. “Rule 5(d) embodies a concern that the general public be afforded access to discovery
materials whenever possible, and that access particularly is appropriate when the subject matter of the
litigation is of special public interest.” 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1152, at 461–62 n.5 (citing
In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987)).
71. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 13 & 16.
72. See 4B Wright & Miller, supra note 56, § 1142, at 417–18 (describing the series of changes).
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
74. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (2000) advisory committee note.
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traditional notion that prelitigation discovery is presumptively open to
the public.
The Advisory Committee made extensive comments related to this
2000 revision, but did not rest their policy choice on privacy interests in
discovery exchange. Instead, the Advisory Committee explained that
since the 1980 amendment, several local districts had adopted rules that
75
either excused or forbid filing of discovery materials. This resulted in a
76
multiplicity of filing requirements from district to district. Consequently,
the 2000 amendments were aimed at eliminating inconsistent filing rules in
77
different districts. In addition to the goal of fostering uniformity of the
FRCP, this Advisory Committee again focused on considerations of
expense, burden, and storage capacity to account for this most recent
78
change.
As mentioned earlier, the Judicial Conference Committees rely on
the notion that there is no presumptive right of access to discovery not
filed with the court to justify their opposition the legislation. Opponents
use a division between filed and unfiled information to justify the
extension of greater privacy rights to litigating parties. Historically,
however, the Advisory Committees did not amend the filing rules to
address privacy concerns. In fact, the current Judicial Conference
Committees’ position is in conflict with the historical motivations for rule
changes as explained by the Advisory Committees at the time of those
revisions. The true motivation for restricted discovery filing requirements
can be found in a careful review of the revisions and amendments to the
FRCP over the past several decades.
B. Misreading SEATTLE TIMES CO. V. RHINEHART
To strengthen the argument that the Sunshine legislation would
have minimal effect, Judge Kravitz, on behalf of the Judicial Conference
Committees, cites to the landmark decision in Seattle Times Co. v.
79
Rhinehart. Just as he suggested that Rule 5 supported a presumption of
privacy in discovery, Judge Kravitz suggests that the Supreme Court has
affirmed the general rule that “what is produced in discovery is not
80
public information” by quoting a portion of the case. The relevant
passage in Seattle Times reads as follows: “Moreover, pretrial depositions
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The 2000 amendment explicitly supersedes and invalidates the local rules. Id.
78. Id.
79. Hearing, supra note 10, at 59–60 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz) (relying on
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984)).
80. Comments on Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508, supra note 23; see also Hearing,
supra note 10, at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz); see Marcus, supra note 24, at 332
(arguing that this comment alone should effectively end the debate surrounding public access to
discovery materials).
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and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such
proceedings were not open to the public at common law, and, in general,
81
they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.” At first
blush, this passage seems relevant to Judge Kravitz’s position, but when
placed in context, this passage does not support Judge Kravitz’s theory.
In fact, it undermines it.
First, the opinion cites to Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, a case dealing
82
with the media and a public right of access to criminal pretrial hearings,
an issue that is wholly irrelevant to the public right of access to discovery
exchanged during civil litigation. Second, even if Gannett were relevant,
as discussed earlier, the FRCP were enacted to expand the scope of
83
discovery in direct response to the restrictive common law approach.
Citing to the former procedure under common law ignores the critical
and fundamental purpose of the rules to modernize litigation procedure,
regardless of the common law approach. Of course, the current scope of
discovery is more liberal than it was at common law—a chief purpose of
84
enacting the FRCP from their inception in 1938.
Further, the passage in Seattle Times that supposedly recognizes the
limits of the public right of access to discovery materials has an extensive
footnote describing the evolution of the filing requirements for
discovery. The footnote does not serve to fortify the theory articulated
by Judge Kravitz. Instead, it bolsters the position this Note takes: that
discovery is presumptively public, and it is the amendments to the filing
Rules that have inadvertently undermined this presumption.
85
The footnote states that “[d]iscovery rarely takes place in public.”
This is indeed the customary practice in modern litigation. Depositions
and interrogatories are nearly always conducted or answered in private
settings. However, it is important to distinguish common practice from
an intentional policy choice. The footnote goes on to say that the “Rules
of Civil Procedure may require parties to file with the clerk of the court
interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admissions, and
86
deposition transcripts.” As discussed earlier, each district was given
discretion to limit the amount of information filed with the court in
response to concerns about storage, expense, and discovery abuse
generally. Hence, while the common practice is inherently private, that
does not mean it is presumptively so. By ignoring the fundamental
81. 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (citation omitted) (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389
(1979)).
82. 443 U.S. 368, 370–71 (1979).
83. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 6; Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party
Access to Pretrial Information in the Federal Courts 1938–2006, 78 U. Colo. L. Rev. 817, 828–32 (2007)
(“The adoption of the FRCP in 1938 marked a new approach and epoch.”).
84. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 828–32.
85. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 n.19.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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motivation behind the amendments, it is easy to see how the effect of the
amendments can be misconstrued. It is true that “the extent that
courthouse records could serve as a source of public information . . . is
87
subject to the control of the trial court,” but not because of a policy
88
choice to limit public access in favor of privacy concerns. This
interpretation of the amendments to the filing requirements and the
realities of modern discovery practice must be corrected.
C. The Effects of Rule 5 Amendments
The changes to Rule 5 have had an unintended effect that has
created a significant problem. Rule 5, as amended, is easily manipulated
to conceal discovery information that ought to be accessible to the
public. The process of hiding discovery can take many forms, but most
common and most devious is the secret settlement agreement.
1. Fashioning Secrecy: How Parties Evade Review
It is now common practice in modern litigation for parties to agree
upon settlement conditions requiring confidentiality for certain aspects
89
of the agreement. In addition to keeping the amount of settlement
secret, these agreements often require a discovering party to return
discovery materials to the disclosing party and to remain silent about
90
information learned during the prelitigation discovery process. Some of
this information is of vital interest to the public but is no longer
accessible to the public due to the changes to the filing requirements in
Rule 5.
2. Understanding Settlement Agreements
Conditioned settlement agreements are increasingly implicated in
litigation that arises when a person is injured, physically or otherwise, by
91
the product or practice of another. This type of litigation proceeds like
any other. First, the injured party brings suit to seek redress for an injury
by asserting general allegations of wrongdoing in the complaint.
Complaints without merit are dismissed, but all others move forward in
the litigation process. Even then, most cases do not go all the way to

87. Id.
88. Comments on Additional Language Proposed for H.R. 1508, supra note 23; see also Hearing,
supra note 10, at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. Mark R. Kravitz).
89. See Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 819 n.8 (describing an attorney who reported that he had not
entered into a settlement agreement without a confidentiality clause in over five years).
90. See Cheit, supra note 37, at 256; Rooks, supra note 16, at 860. But see Reagan et al., supra
note 29, at 7 (finding that, in general, the only thing kept sealed by the sealing of a settlement
agreement is the amount of the settlement).
91. Of the cases cited in the FJC Report, 503 “were categorized as ones ‘that might be of special
public interest,’ involving environmental harm, products liability, sexual abuse, and those with a public
party as defendant.” See Memorandum from the Am. Ass’n for Justice, supra note 35 (quoting
Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 8 tbl.2).
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92

trial. Instead, after some discovery is exchanged, parties usually negotiate
93
a settlement agreement.
The courts encourage settlements. By definition, a settlement is “an
agreement that ends a dispute and results in the voluntary dismissal of
94
any related litigation.” Parties are generally permitted to draft the terms
95
of settlement agreements without judicial involvement. With respect to
public access to court documents, this is where the system breaks
down. First, the vast majority of settlement agreements are not filed with
96
the court. Even if a settlement agreement is filed with the court, it is not
required to receive scrutiny from the courts. In fact, the court has no
right to review a settlement agreement unless it is on behalf of a minor,
97
incompetent, trustee, or class. Because the courts are not permitted to
review and approve the terms of the agreement, information that can
pose a significant danger to public health and safety can be easily
concealed. This restrains the court even if it wants to intervene on behalf
98
of the public.
If parties could be trusted to place the public interest on par with
the interest of individual litigants, the Sunshine in Litigation Act would
not be needed. However, parties are motivated to hide damaging
information because the cost of widespread repair is perceived as too
great in comparison to the cost of individual litigation on an ad hoc
99
basis. In turn, the choice between these two options has the tendency to
inflate the settlement amount offered to the plaintiff in an individual
100
action because silence is seen as a commodity.
Even parties who may otherwise wish to expose the dangerous
practice or product in open litigation proceedings may agree to inflated

92. See, e.g., Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 1.
93. See Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal
Academia, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 681, 691 & n.43 (2005) (“[L]arge numbers of cases filed in federal
or state court are now resolved through ADR, and especially settlement.”). See generally John Barkai
et al., A Profile of Settlement, 42 Ct. Rev.: J. Am. Judges Ass’n 34 (2006).
94. Settlement, Legal Information Institute, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/settlement (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011).
95. See infra note 97. Only settlement agreements under FRCP 23 require court approval. See
Barkai et al., supra note 93, at 1 (“[A]ccurate empirical data about settlement rates does not exist.”).
96. Reagan et al., supra note 29, at 1 (“Usually such agreements are not filed. A high proportion
of civil cases settle, but a sealed settlement agreement is filed in less than one-half of one percent of
civil cases.” (footnote omitted)).
97. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(A)(1). An action may be voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff
without a court order if stipulated or sought prior to the defendant’s filing of an answer or motion for
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (requiring court approval for settlements on behalf of a
class); In re Peanut Corp. of Am., No. 6:10CV027, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91402, at *20 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 25, 2010) (discussing rules related to settlement agreements on behalf of minors).
98. Anderson, supra note 16, at 715.
99. Interview with Prof. Richard Zitrin, supra note 12; see Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1567–68.
100. See Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1565–66 (describing a segment on the television show 60 Minutes
II).
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settlement offers partially for the money, but also because it offers
101
prompt resolution to an otherwise arduous process. When faced with
the choice between quick settlement and years of litigation, it is simply
102
easier for some plaintiffs to choose the speedy and lucrative solution.
Thus, in the hands of two private parties that agree to these settlement
conditions, known dangers to public health and safety can go unchecked
103
for years.
3. Other Mechanisms Resulting in Secrecy: Protective Orders
Parties have manipulated other judicial mechanisms to limit
transparency in the litigation process. Stipulated or umbrella protective
orders, contracts separate from the settlement agreement created to
avoid court scrutiny, pseudonyms, sealed documents, and returned or
destroyed discovery are all tactics that are frequently used to accomplish
104
the same end as conditioned settlements. As a result of these practices,
the public often learns about the dangers to public health and safety
105
many years, and many victims, after the first suit is brought.
Protective orders are by far the most common mechanism used for
protecting privacy interest and are, therefore, the proper target of
legislation aimed at regulating secret settlements. Protective orders serve
a legitimate purpose: The procedural device is in place to “protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
106
burden or expense.” However, protective orders have also become a
mechanism for preventing public access to information vital to public
health and safety. Courts are required to review protective orders before
107
they are enforceable. Nevertheless, orders undergo far less judicial
108
scrutiny when both parties stipulate to them. The rationale for the
limited scrutiny is that if both parties agree to the terms, there is little
109
need for an overworked judiciary to interfere. This reasoning fails to
consider the possibility that both parties might have an incentive to
stipulate to secrecy during the litigation because it can be used as a
110
leverage point for settlement agreements. Thus, in the interest of

101. See id. (detailing the story of Kim Van Etten, whose son died in a car accident, and her
decision to accept a settlement requiring her to keep secret both the amount of settlement and
documents discovered during litigation).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1573–75 (detailing media publicity bringing to light secret settlements behind
Firestone shredding tires, Zomax related deaths, and General Motors, among others).
104. See Cheit, supra note 37, at 234, 256.
105. Id. at 232–33 (citing examples of tragedies that could have been averted if the defects or
dangers were available to the public sooner).
106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
107. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
108. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 2.
109. Id.
110. This is also true for settlement agreements. Anderson, supra note 16, at 730–31.
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reinforcing the courts’ role as a protector of the public interest, all
protective orders should undergo thorough scrutiny, even when both
parties stipulate the order. The Sunshine in Litigation Act addresses
these tactics and gaps in the current procedure. In addition to requiring
the courts to determine whether issues of public health and safety are
implicated in settlement agreements, the Act requires a similar inquiry
111
before a protective order may be issued. The legislation applies to both
stipulated orders and to those unilaterally requested.

V. Why the Sunshine in Litigation Act Is a
Necessary National Mandate
It not altogether surprising that when parties’ lawyers are left to
their own devices, they will often choose secrecy over disclosure in order
to protect their clients’ interest. This choice is in line with the duty to
112
zealously advocate for a client. But when no one is watching, people
tend to make poor choices. The choice to condition settlement upon
secrecy can have a dramatic impact well beyond the bounds of individual
litigation, affecting the health and safety of thousands of people.
The court should play a chief role in the adoption of such
agreements when matters of concern to public health and safety are
implicated. The courts took an active role in curbing other forms of
113
discovery abuse beginning the 1970s. Now, faced with a new form of
discovery abuse, it is appropriate to look to the courts to guard against
secrecy abuses too.
Unfortunately, courts have neither the time nor the inclination to
review the substantive information that is the basis for secret settlement
agreements and its potential impact on public health and safety. The
already demanding workload that most jurisdictions endure precludes
voluntary adoption of the procedures embodied in the proposed
114
legislation. Because the courts are not equipped to voluntarily take on

111. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, S. 537, 111th Cong. § 1660(a)(1)(B)(i) (2009) (“A court
shall not enter an order under rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restricting the
disclosure of information obtained through discovery, an order approving a settlement agreement that
would restrict the disclosure of such information, or an order restricting access to court records in a
civil case unless the court has made findings of fact that . . . the public interest in the disclosure of
potential health or safety hazards is outweighed by a specific and substantial interest in maintaining
the confidentiality of the information or records in question . . . .”).
112. Zitrin, supra note 16, at 1594 (“[A]ttorneys believing it to be in their client’s economic
interests to enter into a secrecy agreement will simply do so; their perceived duty of advocacy will
trump any possibility of disclosing . . . .”).
113. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 832 (“Since 1970 . . . [t]he thrust of the amendments to the
federal rules . . . has been toward containing cost and time expended on the exchange of pretrial
information.”); see also infra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
114. Alan F. Blaklely, To Squeal or Not to Squeal: Ethical Obligations of Officers of the Court in
Possession of Information of Public Interest, 34 Cumb. L. Rev. 65, 74 (2003) (“If the parties desire
confidetiality [sic] and present such a request to the court, what incentive does the court have to
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more responsibility, the need for legislative reform mandating the
judiciary to take an active role in the creation and approval of secret
settlement agreements and protective orders is even more crucial.
Without mandated intervention, local courts could address this problem
in myriad ways, with varying levels of scrutiny, resulting in fractured
outcomes that depend upon the jurisdiction in which the case is tried.
Thus, in an era of national litigation, forum shopping may become an
115
obstacle if the legislation is not implemented at a national level.
A. The Rules Governing Discovery
The legislation properly targets Rule 26(c), the protective order
provision, to remedy the abuses stemming from changes to the filing
requirements. Parties with legitimate privacy considerations should
continue to utilize this Rule to keep discovery information confidential.
However, parties with improper motives for concealing settlement
agreements and seeking protective orders must be stopped.
From the creation of the FRCP in 1938 through the 1970s, the focus
of the rules governing discovery was on liberalizing discovery
116
procedures. The rules were crafted with the expansive concepts of
equity in mind, which resulted in broad discovery practice from the
117
outset. After 1970, the focus of the rules governing discovery shifted
“toward containing cost and time expended on the exchange of pretrial
118
information.”
In addition to amending Rule 5, as described above, the 1970
amendments also restructured the rules governing discovery in order to
119
create one rule addressing the scope of discovery generally. This rule
was designated Rule 26, which had previously governed only
120
Prior to the restructuring, the discovery rules were
depositions.
121
separate and self-contained. Therefore, any prior amendment made to
the rules governing discovery occurred on an ad hoc basis and was

analyze the order? . . . Given the busy court dockets and the court’s desire that parties manage their
own discovery, should courts be expected to add to this duty to their already overburdened load?”).
115. Forum shopping occurs when multiple courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s
claims, and the plaintiff chooses the court that will treat his or her claims most favorably. See Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–76 (1938) (describing litigants in cases with diversity jurisdiction
moving suits to different federal courts to benefit from the laws of the forum state).
116. See Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 831; see also Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American
Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 Tul. J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 153,
159–61 (1999).
117. See Marcus, supra note 116, at 158.
118. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 832; see also Marcus, supra note 116, at 164–65.
119. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
48 F.R.D. 487, 490 (1970).
120. Id.
121. Id.

Keaney_62-HLJ-795 (Do Not Delete)

816

3/4/2011 12:26 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:795

122

incorporated by reference through other rules. Due to the nature and
complexity of the 1970 amendments, and predictions about future
amendments, the restructuring was considered a necessary and
123
convenient way to organize the rules governing discovery.
1. Rule 26(c) Protective Orders
Particularly relevant to this discussion is Rule 26(c), which governs
124
the procedure for obtaining protective orders. The Rule “empowers
the court to make a wide variety of orders for the protection of parties
125
and witnesses in the discovery process.” The understanding that
“parties engaged in litigation do not sacrifice all aspects of privacy or
their proprietary information simply because of a lawsuit” is a strong
126
foundation for the Rule. “But there remains a concomitant principle
favoring full, fair, and open disclosure of the important matters occurring
127
[in] the public’s courts.” These guiding principles are pivotal in
understanding the essence of Rule 26(c) and its relationship to the other
discovery rules. In fact, the 1970 Advisory Committee commentary notes
that changes were made to clarify the Rule and to “avoid any possible
implication that a protective order . . . may not safeguard against ‘undue
128
burden or expense.’”
Along with focusing on the added expense and storage of filed
129
documents, discovery abuse was a genuine concern in the 1970s. In fact,
the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse was charged
with examining the FRCP to find ways to “reduce both the excessive cost
130
and unnecessary delay” associated with established discovery abuses.
With the aim of curbing discovery abuse and controlling time and cost
expenditures, many amendments have been made over the last few
decades to the rules governing discovery.

122. Id. (“From 1938 until the present, a few amendments have applied a discovery provision to
several rules. For example, in 1948, the scope of deposition discovery in Rule 26(b) and the provision
for protective orders in Rule 30(b) were incorporated by reference in Rules 33 and 34.”). Protective
orders are “directly applicable to all forms of discovery.” 8A Wright et al., supra note 69, § 2035, at
142; see also 12A Wright et al., supra note 58, app. c, at 289.
123. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
48 F.R.D. at 490 (“Proposals of a similar nature will probably be made in the future.”).
124. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Prior to 1970, this was codified as Rule 30(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
(1970) advisory committee note.
125. 8A Wright et al., supra note 69, at 141.
126. Id. (quoting In re Mirapex Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.R.D. 668, 672–73 (D. Minn. 2007)).
127. Id. (quoting Mirapex, 246 F.R.D. at 672–73).
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (1970) advisory committee note.
129. The Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse notes several examples of
“discovery abuse” that prompted their study, including unnecessary discovery, improper withholding
of discoverable information, and misuse of discovery procedures such as excessively burdensome
interrogatories. Am. Bar Ass’n, Second Report for the Special Comm. on Abuse of Discovery,
92 F.R.D. 137, 138, 147 (1980).
130. Id. at 137.
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Beginning in 1983, the Advisory Committee sought to “enhanc[e]
judicial responsibility to oversee litigation, with special emphasis on
131
discovery and sanctions for litigation misconduct.” Changes to judicial
responsibility include requiring discovery conferences, requiring signatures
on discovery requests, directing judges to curtail disproportionate
132
discovery, and permitting judges to order time limits on discovery.
Later, in 1993, the FRCP were again amended to reinforce the
intended restraint on discovery by “impos[ing] numerical limits on
depositions and interrogatories[,] . . . imposing a moratorium on formal
discovery until the parties had met and fashioned a discovery
133
plan . . . [and creating the] ‘initial disclosure’ duty . . . .” But, as with the
optional Rule 5 amendments of the same era, courts did not have to
conform to this national scheme thus resulting in a lack of uniformity in
134
the application of discovery rules, prompting the 1996 amendments.
Notably, all of these revisions to the discovery rules focused on other
subdivisions. Rule 26(c) has remained relatively the same since the 1970
revisions. However, new abuses have surfaced that require modification
of the rule governing protective orders.
B. Correlating the Changes to Rule 5 with the Rules Governing
Discovery
All the changes to discovery procedures were made with the intent
to control costs and curb discovery abuse. Protective orders remain the
proper mechanism for protecting privacy interests, but the 2000
amendment to Rule 5 filing requirements has stifled the purpose of this
judicial mechanism. Prior to the gradual erosion of the filing
requirement, the FRCP required, or at least permitted, the filing of a
135
variety of discovery materials. As such, making secrecy a condition of
settlement agreements would have served little purpose because the
damaging information would be on file with the court and readily
136
available to the public.
Now that the filing requirement has been removed, this barrier has
been eviscerated, and secret settlements have taken on a whole new
meaning. Courts are no longer permitted to balance competing interest
in the discovery context. Because “the [2000] revised Rule [5] prohibits

131. Marcus, supra note 116, at 162. This was partially triggered by an ABA recommendation to
narrow discovery. Id.
132. See id. at 162.
133. Id. at 163.
134. Id. at 164.
135. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (1992); see Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 851 (“The pre-2000 Rule required
discovery materials to be filed unless exempted by the court . . . .”).
136. See Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 838 (discussing pretrial discovery that is often implicated in
secret settlement agreements).
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discovery materials from being filed unless they are ‘used in a court
proceeding,’” it effectively bars the general public from accessing
information that may be of interest and that would have been publicly
137
available—absent a protective order—before the revision.
However, even before the amendment, pretrial discovery
information was not automatically available to third parties, nor could
such information be used for any purpose. If requested by a party, courts
considered whether good cause had been shown for a protective order
under Rule 26(c) in determining the right of access to discovery
138
materials. Courts were properly charged with balancing the interests of
parties with legitimate privacy or business concerns against the broader
139
public interest in transparency in litigation. Unfortunately, the need for
this analysis has been eliminated by the amendment to Rule 5. Even
worse, the Judicial Conference Committees have conflated the intent
behind the filing requirement revisions with the role of Rule 26(c)
protective orders. This error gives litigants the opportunity to shield
important information from the public that should remain accessible
when exchanged between parties.
Equally damaging, the 2000 amendment to the filing requirement
gives legitimacy to the Judiciary Conference Committees’ erroneous
conclusions about the underlying policy choices behind the amendments
to the filing requirement. Litigants with incentive to shield information
of interest to public health and safety will point to the now limited public
access to discovery documents to support a presumption of privacy.
While there may be legitimate reasons for limiting public access to the
materials exchanged during discovery, the discussion should be based
upon the true motivations of the drafting Advisory Committees and not
a mistaken assumption. The notion that there is a policy restricting public
access to discovery has no place in the debate.
C. The Scope of the Legislation
As a basic premise, parties to litigation are limited to resolving a
controversy personal to them and are not permitted to litigate on behalf
of the public at large, or even known third parties. Unless the plaintiff
meets the constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and

137. Id. at 851 (quoting 1 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 5.33[2] (3d ed. 1997)).
Technological advancements in the storage of electronic data nullify some of the storage and burden
arguments used to support the revision to Rule 5. See id. at 876–77 (“Electronic filing improves judge,
court staff, and public access to case files; decreases court costs through increased productivity and
efficiency; reduces physical handling, maintenance, and copying of files; improves docketing,
scheduling, case management, and statistical reporting; and enhances accuracy and efficiency in record
maintenance.”).
138. Fed. R Civ. P. 26(c); Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 856.
139. Moskowitz, supra note 83, at 856.
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redressability, or has a “close relationship” to right holder, and the third
party right holder is unable to assert his or her own rights, the plaintiff
140
cannot properly present grievances to the court. This Note does not
advocate for an expansion of the standing doctrine so that parties may
litigate on behalf of others who are similarly situated. Individuals injured
at the hands of another deserve their own redress, and the judicial
process will adequately resolve disputes between parties on a microlevel. Rather, this Note argues in favor of removing some of the barriers
to transparency in the pretrial litigation process. The restoration of
mechanisms no longer in place will help potential litigants assert their
rights more efficiently when they have been wronged through deliberate
acts to conceal information relevant to public health and safety.
Moreover, defining the scope of information relevant to public
health and safety in this context is simpler than some legal commentators
141
make it out to be. The scope of the information can be equated to the
legal principle used when determining whether or not something is
142
“material” to a person’s decisionmaking process. Essentially, any
information about a dangerous product or practice that would affect an
individual’s choice, consumer or otherwise, because it poses a risk to
their health and well-being satisfies the criteria for implicating public
health and safety. The public has an unavoidable right to access this
information as soon as it is exchanged in discovery, and no private
agreement between litigating parties can or should be permitted to trump
that basic power without demonstrating a significant reason to overcome
it. Assuming this public right of access can be overcome, the need for
privacy for individual litigants can be accommodated while still disclosing
pertinent information to the public at-large. Accordingly, any settlement
conditioned on the return of discovery materials and a vow of silence
from the plaintiff should be closely scrutinized by the court to ensure that

140. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414–16 (1991) (holding that requirements were satisfied to
establish third-party standing to protect equal protection rights of potential jurors, and not those of the
defendant, where prosecutors use peremptory challenges based upon race); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (addressing who has standing to challenge prosecutors that use peremptory
challenges based on race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196–97 (1976) (holding that beer vendors had
standing to sue on behalf of eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old males prohibited from purchasing beer);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259–60 (1953). But see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612
(1973) (establishing that rights of hypothetical third parties may be asserted if law restricting speech is
substantially overbroad); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614–16 (1971) (holding that picketers in a
labor dispute who were arrested under a misdemeanor ordinance prohibiting “blocking sidewalks”
were allowed to bring a facial challenge against the ordinance).
141. Marcus, supra note 13, at 20–21 (arguing that problems exist in determining when to apply
closer scrutiny).
142. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “material” as: “Of such a nature that knowledge of the item
would affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential.” Black’s Law Dictionary 450 (3d
pocket ed. 2006).
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the judiciary is actively fulfilling its duty to the public interest as a whole,
as well as to the individual litigants involved.
Even more important than remedying past concealment of dangers
to public health and safety, the proposed legislation regulating settlement
agreements and protective orders prevents these conditioned agreements
from ever occurring in the first place. By eliminating the opportunity to
enter into settlement agreements that allow litigants to bargain for
silence surrounding a known danger, accountability will more or less be
mandated for defendants once they become aware of a problem. Not
only will they be liable for past wrongs, but also the public will demand
that a known danger be corrected. Defendants will be forced to redress
their wrongs, or risk that the public will abandon their product or
practice in protest of their deception and/or complacency with an inferior
product or injurious practice.

Conclusion
Proponents of restricted access to discovery materials rely upon the
incorrect assumption that discovery is inherently private. This Note
makes clear that restricted access to pretrial discovery has been an
unintended consequence of amendments made to the FRCP since the
1970s and is not part of a larger scheme to shield discovery information
from public view. Instead, information exchanged during pretrial
discovery, whether filed or not, is presumptively public and should only
be sealed upon proper showing from the parties. The Sunshine in
Litigation Act addresses this problem and helps to restore the public’s
right of access to information exchanged during discovery.

